Third Party Suits Under Section 3612 of the Fair Housing Act of 1968 by Grasso, Gary A.
Fordham Urban Law Journal
Volume 5 | Number 2 Article 7
1977
Third Party Suits Under Section 3612 of the Fair
Housing Act of 1968
Gary A. Grasso
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Fordham Urban Law Journal by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.
Recommended Citation
Gary A. Grasso, Third Party Suits Under Section 3612 of the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 5 Fordham Urb. L.J. 337 (1977).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol5/iss2/7
THIRD PARTY SUITS UNDER SECTION 3612 OF
THE FAIR HOUSING ACT OF 1968
I. Introduction
The Fair Housing Act of 1968 (1968 Act)' makes it unlawful, with
minor exceptions,' to discriminate in the sale or rental of private
housing. Sections 3610 and 3612' provide for enforcement of the
1. Civil Rights Act of 1968, §§ 801-19, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19 (1970), as amended, (Supp.
V, 1975) [hereinafter cited as the 1968 Act]. The 1968 Act was amended to cover discrimina-
tions based on sex. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-06 (Supp. V, 1975). The 1968 Act prohibits discrimina-
tions in the sale or rental of housing based on race, color, religion, national origin and as of
1974, sex. It is more comprehensive than 42 U.S.C. § 1982 which applies solely to discrimina-
tion based on race. Id. § 1982 (1970). The 1968 Act was declared constitutional as within the
enforcement power granted to Congress in the thirteenth amendment to erase the "badges
and incident of slavery." United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 214 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 934 (1972).
2. The 1968 Act currently exempts units of four families or less, one of which is occupied
by the owner. 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(2) (1970). It also exempts the owner of three or less single
family houses sold without the aid of a broker or advertisements and, then, only for one sale
in any twenty-four month period. Id. § 3603(b)(1). Religious organizations can restrict the
sale or rental of their housing for non-commercial purposes to members of their religion unless
membership in the religion is based on race, color, or national origin. Also, private clubs who
provide lodgings on a non-commercial basis for their members can restrict the rental to their
members. Id. § 3607. However, the Supreme Court in Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409 (1968),
found that 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970) prohibited all discrimination against blacks in the sale or
rental of personal property and extended section 1982 to purely private discrimination for the
first time since the section was enacted in 1866. Combining the Jones decision with the 1968
Act, it is arguable that all housing in the United States is included in these prohibitions when
refusal to rent or sell is based on race.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 3610 (1970). Section 3610(a) provides in pertinent part:
Any person who claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice
or who believes that he will be irrevocably injured by a discriminatory housing practice
that is about to occur (hereinafter "person aggrieved") may file a complaint with the
Secretary. . . . Within thirty days after receiving a complaint, or within thirty days
after the expiration of any period of reference under subsection (c) of this section, the
Secretary shall investigate the complaint and give notice in writing to the person
aggrieved whether he intends to resolve it. If the Secretary decides to resolve the
complaint, he shall proceed to try to eliminate or correct the alleged discriminatory
practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion. ...
Id. § 3610(a).
4. Id. § 3612. Section 3612(a) provides in pertinent part:
The rights granted by sections 3603, 3604, 3605, and 3606 of this title may be en-
forced by civil actions in appropriate United States district courts without regard to
the amount in controversy and in appropriate State or local courts of general jurisdic-
tion. A civil action shall be commenced within one hundred and eighty days after the
alleged discriminatory housing practice occurred . . .
Id. § 3612(a).
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statute by private complainants. Section 3610 combines adminis-
trative and judicial remedies by requiring federal or state adminis-
trative agencies to attempt a conciliatory resolution of a complaint
before the complainant may seek relief in federal court.' Complaints
made under this section cannot reach the courts until all adminis-
trative remedies are exhausted.'
Section 3612 gives the complainant preferential access to an ap-
propriate federal or state court without preconditions.7 However, the
1968 Act does not state whether section 3612 is an alternative rem-
edy to section 3610. In cases where the complainant was denied
housing because of his race, the courts have held that section 3612
was independent of section 3610 and could be used as an alternative
remedy to the conciliation-then-litigation approach of that section.'
The alternative use of these sections continues to be a question
in cases where the complainant is raising the rights of third parties.
In Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. ,' residents of an
apartment complex alleged under section 3610 that management of
the complex violated the 1968 Act by denying housing to black
applicants. The Supreme Court found that the broad drafting of
section 3610 gave complainants standing to sue.'" The Court in
Trafficante took no position on whether such plaintiffs could sue
under section 3612. However, in TOPIC v. Circle Realty, " the Ninth
Circuit denied standing to plaintiffs arguing third party rights
under section 3612. Furthermore, language in TOPIC suggests that
the sections may not provide alternative remedies even when the
complainant is the direct object of private housing discrimination. 2
This Note will examine the standing and alternative use questions
involving sections 3610 and 3612 of the 1968 Act.
5. Id. § 3610(a).
6. Id. § 3610(d).
7. Id. § 3612(a).
8. See, e.g., Howard v. W.P. Bill Atkinson Enterprises, 412 F. Supp. 610, 611-12 (W.D.
Okla. 1975); Warren v. Norman Realty Co., 375 F. Supp. 478, 480 (D. Neb. 1974), afj'd, 513
F.2d 730 (8th Cir. 1975); Crim v. Glover, 338 F. Supp. 823, 825-26 (S.D. Ohio 1972); Johnson
v. Decker, 333 F. Supp. 88, 90 (N.D. Cal. 1971); Brown v. Lo Duca, 307 F. Supp. 102, 103-04
(E.D. Wis. 1969). See also Comment, The Fair Housing Act of 1968: Its Success and Failure,
9 SUFFOLK L. REV. 1312, 1319 (1975).
9. 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
10. Id. at 209.
11. 532 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 160 (1977).
12. Id. at 1275.
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II. Alternative Remedies
The administrative phase of section 3610 begins when a written,
verified complaint is filed with the Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) 3 no later than 180 days after the alleged dis-
criminatory housing practice occurred. 4 The Secretary has thirty
days to investigate the complaint and determine whether it can be
resolved administratively 5 by informal methods such as confer-
ences, conciliation and persuasion." However, if the Secretary de-
termines. that the state in which the alleged incident occurred has
a housing law "substantially equivalent" to the 1968 Act, he must
give that state the first opportunity to resolve the matter. 7 The
complainant may bring suit for an additional thirty days while ei-
ther the state or federal conciliation efforts are transpiring." Even
if conciliation fails, an action can be brought in federal district court
only if there are no substantially equivalent remedies available
under appropriate state law." By contrast, section 3612 gives the
complainant preferential access to federal district court without
administrative preconditions.20
The 1968 Act was added as an amendment to the Civil Rights Act
of 1968 (Civil Rights Act)"' on the Senate floor, 2 and was never
subjected to committee debate. Thus, there is no conclusive legisla-
tive history on the issues of whether sections 3610 and 3612 are
alternative remedies and whether either section can be utilized to
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3610(a)-(b) (1970).
14. Id. § 3610(b).
15. Id. § 3610(d). This right is also subject to the proviso of subsection (c) requiring HUD
to refer the complaint to the state involved if certain conditions exist. Id. § 3610(c).
16. Id. § 3610(a).
17. Id. § 3610(c).
18. Id.
19. Id. § 3610(d).
20. Id. § 3612(a). The complainant has 180 days from the date of the alleged incident to
institute suit. Id.
21. The 1968 Act was Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (H.R. 2516). Act of April
11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 801-19, 82 Stat. 81.
22. Dubofsky, Fair Housing: A Legislative History and a Perspective, 8 WASHBURN L.J.
149, 152 (1969) (The author was legislative assistant to Senator Walter F. Mondale, chief
sponsor of the 1968 Act in the Senate.) Senator Mondale had proposed a bill similar to the
1968 Act in 1967, but it stalled in the Banking and Currency Committee. See 113 CONG. REC.
7545 (1967) (remarks of Senator Mondale). The Civil Rights Act of 1968, as passed by the
House, did not contain provisions for fair housing. See Dubofsky, supra at 149 n.2.
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raise the rights of third parties.23
The original version of the 1968 Act gave HUD the power to issue
cease and desist orders,24 but there was no provision for direct access
to federal court. Legal action by the complainant was permitted if
HUD failed to act.25 This version was altered by a compromise
amendment which eliminated HUD's ability to issue cease and des-
ist orders and added section 3612.6 However, the Senate did not
indicate whether this additional remedy was meant as an alterna-
tive to the administrative enforcement entrusted to HUD.
During debate of the 1968 Act in the House, several representa-
tives noted that in addition to the administrative remedies, the 1968
Act would authorize immediate civil suits by private persons.27 Also,
the staff of the House Judiciary Committee reported that section
3612 was "apparently an alternative to the conciliation-then-
litigation approach [of section 3610] . ,,.I The House never
confirmed this view with the Senate because it voted to accept the
Senate amendments to the Civil Rights Act, including the 1968
Act, without a joint committee conference.
23. Mr. Justice Douglas tried to rely on the legislative history of the 1968 Act in
Trafficante, but concluded that the history was "not too helpful." 409 U.S. at 210. Also, much
of the debate over the 1968 Act concerned whether an open-housing law in any form should
be passed. See, e.g., 114 CONG. REC. 3757 (1968) (remarks of Senator Javits).
24. 114 CONG. REC. 2271-72 (1968) (remarks of Senator Mondale); Dubofsky, supra note
22, at 150.
25. 114 CONG. REC. 2272 (1968) (remarks of Senator Mondale).
26. Id. Senator Everett Dirksen offered this amendment which became the 1968 Act. See
Id. at 4570 (remarks of Senator Dirksen).
27. Id. at 9560 (remarks of Representative Celler). Representative Celler supported the
1968 Act and interpreted the bill as authorizing immediate civil suits by private persons. Id.
Representative Pucinski was opposed to the 1968 Act because it would culminate, in his view,
in extensive federal regulation of local communities. Id. at 9603-04 (remarks of Representative
Pucinski).
28. Id. at 9612; see also Id. at 4908 (memorandum of the Justice Department stating that
section 3612 was an alternative to pursuing a section 3610 remedy).
29. Dubofsky, supra note 22, at 160. Many of the representatives believed that the vote
by the House to accept the Senate amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1968 was principally
due to the murder of Dr. Martin Luther King during the debates. See 114 CONG. REC. 9603
(remarks of Representative Randall). Representative Randall deplored the assassination of
Dr. King but stated that the 1968 Act or similar legislation would "not stop incidents of this
kind .. " Id. Representative Latta contended that the House was "being forced to act in
haste" because of the prevailing racial tension resulting from Dr. King's death. Id. at 9566.
Representative Donohue urged the House to "avoid a rash consideration of the bill." Id.
at 9600. Representative Dowdy believed the House was acting pursuant to the demands of
"mobs" and was passing the 1968 Act out of fear. Id. at 9593.
NOTES
Sections 3610 and 3612 have been held to be alternative remedies
in cases where the complainants were directly injured by a discrimi-
natory housing practice. 0 In Brown v. Lo Duca,3' the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin concluded that
Congress enacted section 3612 as an expeditious alternative to sec-
tion 3610. Plaintiff black man alleged in Brown that defendant cor-
poration discriminated against him with respect to the rental of an
apartment. 2 Defendant contended that the provisions of section
3610 applied to section 3612, thereby prohibiting an immediate civil
action in a federal court if there were equivalent state remedies
available.3 The Brown court concluded that section 3612 was an
alternative remedy and standing under that section was not contin-
gent upon meeting the administrative requirements of section
3610.3
In concluding that sections 3610 and 3612 were alternatives, the
Brown court relied upon the statutory language of both sections.
The court noted that section 3610(f) referred to actions brought
"pursuant to this section or section 3612. ''3'1 It also observed that
section 3612(a) referred to actions "brought pursuant to this section
or section 3610(d)."3 1 The Brown court held that the use of the
disjunctive in both sections clearly indicated that the two sections
were alternatives. 7 Moreover, the court reasoned that Congress
30. See note 8 supra.
31. 307 F. Supp. 102 (E.D. Wis. 1969).
32. Id. at 102. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (1970) makes it unlawful, inter alia, "[tlo refuse to
sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer . . . a dwelling to any person because of
race. . . ." The requirement of a bona fide purchaser has been held to apply to section 3604
in situations involving the denial to rent or sell. See United States v. Youritan Constr. Co.,
370 F. Supp. 643, 650 (N.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd, 509 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1975). A strict reading of
section 3604 would appear to bar TOPIC or any of its members from bringing suit under this
section since the test couples were not bona fide puchasers. In order to argue third party rights
the court may have required the organization to show that the realtors had employed racial
steering against bona fide pruchasers.
33. 307 F. Supp. at 103. Wisconsin has an appropriate open-housing law. See Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 101.22 (West Supp. 1976).
34. 307 F. Supp. at 103.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 103-04. Reinforcing this view is the statutory language giving section 3612
complainants expeditious calendar treatment:
Any court in which a proceeding is instituted under section 3612 or 3613 of this title
shall assign the case for hearing at the earliest practicable date and cause the case to
be in every way expedited.
42 U.S.C. § 3614 (1970).
37. 307 F. Supp. at 104.
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would not have included provisions dealing with time, venue,
amount in controversy, and the type of relief available in both sec-
tions if it intended section 3612 to be nothing more than an adjunct
to section 3610.8
The Brown court also examined the legislative history of the 1968
Act to support its conclusion. It quoted Representative Emmanuel
Celler of New York who stated: "In addition to administrative reme-
dies, the bill [1968 Act] authorizes immediate civil suits by private
persons within 180 days after the alleged discriminatory housing
practice . . . . " The court cited other similar statements and held
that the two sections were altnerative remedies.'
In Johnson v. Decker,4 the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California accepted the rationale of Brown,"2
and then went further by holding that there was nothing in the 1968
Act which prohibited the filing for suit under section 3612 while a
section 3610 administrative proceeding was pending."3 The Johnson
court concluded that the two sections were separate and individual
provisions which granted complementary remedies,44 and that a
:38. !d. at 103.
39. Id. at 104.
40. Id. The court cited similar statements by Representatives Randall and Pucinski in
addition to reports submitted by the House Judiciary Committee and the Justice Depart-
ment.
41. 333 F. Supp. 88 (N.D. Cal. 1971). Plaintiff black woman, with a husband and child,
filed a complaint with HUD under section 3610. Seventeen days later, before the
administrative procedures could possibly conclude, plaintiff filed this suit in federal court
under section 3612. Id. at 89-90. This decision is a high water mark in the alternative use of
sections 3610 and 3612.
42. Id. at 90.
43. Id. at 91-92. California has an open-housing law substantially equivalent to the 1968
Act. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 35700-45 (West Supp. 1976). By allowing Mrs.
Johnson to abandon section 3610 and follow section 3612, the court is effectively allowing
plaintiff to circumvent the state remedy and avoid any possible administrative delay. Mrs.
Johnson also sued under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-82 (1970) and defendants claimed the limitation
in section 3610(d) also applied to these sections. The Johnson Court did not find defendants'
argument persuasive. 333 F. Supp. at 92. With the revival of section 1982 being discussed in
Congress because of the pending decision of Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409 (1968), it is unlikely
that Congress would enact section 3610(d) as a comprehensive limitation on sections 1981 and
1982 without express reference to those provisions. Also, in Jones, the Court emphasized that
passage of the 1968 Act had no limiting effect on section 1982. 392 U.S. at 413.
44. 333 F. Supp. at 91; accord, Crim v. Glover, 338 F. Supp. 823 (S.D. Ohio 1972). In
Crim, a black married couple was denied rental housing in Columbus, Ohio because of their
race. The state had a law substantially equivalent to the 1968 Act and, thus, plaintiff had
available state remedies if the complaint had been made under section 3610. Id. at 825; see
text accompanying note 17 supra.
NOTES
complainant could proceed under both sections simultaneously. 5
III. Third Party Suits: Section 3610
Section 3610 gives standing to sue to any "person aggrieved," and
defines "person aggrieved" as "[a]ny person who claims to have
been injured by a discriminatory housing practice or who believes
that he will be irrevocably injured by a discriminatory housing prac-
tice that is about to occur .... "I'
Section 3612 does not employ such a term as "person aggrieved"
nor does it define the class of complainants who have standing to
sue. The section merely states that "[t]he rights granted by sec-
tions 3603, 3604, 3605, and 3606 of this title may be enforced by civil
actions in appropriate United States district courts . . . ."I Since
both sections employ broad descriptions of the class of complainants
entitled to relief under the 1968 Act, various courts" have been
forced to decide whether complainants who raise the rights of third
parties have standing under the statute and whether such complain-
ants can use the two sections as independent alternative remedies.
In Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,4" the Supreme
Court concluded that the "person aggrieved" language of section
3610 could include complainants raising the rights of third parties.
Plaintiffs, a white and a black resident of an apartment complex,
alleged that defendant discriminated against third party non-white
rental applicants." Plaintiffs filed separate complaints with HUD
under the provisions of section 3610. 51 When a voluntary agreement
could not be reached, plaintiffs insituted a section 3610 suit in fed-
eral district court." The district court held that plaintiffs were not
"persons aggrieved" under section 3610 and denied standing."3 The
45. 333 F. Supp. at 90-91. Defendants also claimed such a ruling required them to defend
on two fronts (i.e., against sections 3610 and 3612). Id. at 90. This is a strained argument
since the violation and, thus, the defense are the same.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a) (1970).
47. Id. 3612(a).
48. See, e.g., Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972), rev'g 446 F.2d
1158 (9th Cir. 1971); Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 322 F. Supp. 352 (N.D. Cal.
1971). See also TOPIC v. Circle Realty, 532 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1976), rev'g. 377 F. Supp.
111 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
49. 409 U.S. 205 (1972); For a discussion of Trafficante, see 51 N.C. L. REV. 1530 (1973).
50. 409 U.S. at 206-07.
51. Id. at 206.
52. Id. at 207.
53. 322 F. Supp. 352 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
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Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, 5 reasoning that Congress
meant sections 3610 and 3612 for those persons "who are the objects
of discriminatory housing practices."' '55
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed and granted stand-
ing.5" Plaintiffs in Trafficante had alleged injury from a denial of the
benefits of living in an integrated community.57 Mr. Justice Douglas
found that since plaintiffs alleged injury with "particularity," they
satisfied the personal stake requirements of article III of the Consti-
tution."8 In reaching this conclusion, he stated that Congress had
passed the 1968 Act as an expression of an equal housing policy of
the highest national priority" and, consequently, intended to define
standing as broadly as is permitted under article III." Furthermore,
Mr. Justice Douglas reasoned that "private attorneys general" suits
were needed to protect not only the direct victims of housing dis-
crimination, but also the indirect victims whose daily lives are af-
fected by discriminatory management." However, the Trafficante
Court specifically stated that the "person aggrieved" language
54. 446 F.2d 1158 (9th Cir. 1971).
55. Id. at 1162.
56. 409 U.S. at 212. Mr. Justices White, Blackmun and Powell filed a concurring opinion
emphasizing that without the 1968 Act, standing would probably not arise. Id. at 212 (concur-
ring opinion).
57. Id. at 208.
58. Id. at 211. Mr. Justice Douglas found that plaintiffs had also met the traditional
standing rules. Id. at 211, citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (taxpayer given standing
to challenge federal expenditure to all educational institutions in violations of the
Establishment Clause).
59. 409 U.S. at 211.
60. Id. at 209. The Court stated: "We can give vitality to 810(a) [section 36101 only by
a generous construction which gives standing to sue to all in the same housing unit who are
injured by racial discrimination in the management of those facilities within the coverage of
the statute." Id. at 212.
61. The district court and court of appeals would not apply the "private attorneys
general" concept in Trafficante, 446 F.2d at 1162, 322 F. Supp. at 353. Section 3613 of the
1968 Act gives the Attorney General power to institute suits to remedy "patterns and prac-
tices" of discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (1970). Since TOPIC and Trafficante are suits that
arise from several discriminatory acts occurring over a period of time, it would seem that
section 3613 is the proper provision. However, Mr. Justice Douglas noted that as a practical
matter, the Attorney General's office could not handle the volume of all such suits and in
the interest of justice it would be appropriate to promote the "private attorneys general"
concept in these situations. 409 U.S. at 211. Also, the TOPIC court concluded that since the
racial steering of the defendants transpired over a long period of time, injunctive relief would
be inappropriate and the proper channel should be through section 3613. 532 F.2d at 1276.
However, under section 3613 the Attorney General's relief is restricted to injunctions. 42
U.S.C. § 3613 (1970).
[Vol. V
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granted standing only to persons within "the same housing unit." 2
The Court did not consider whether plaintiffs could have pro-
ceeded under section 3612 to raise the rights of third parties. But
Mr. Justice Douglas did state: "[m]oreover, these rights may be
enforced 'by civil actions in appropriate United States district
courts .. . .'3 Apparently, Mr. Justice Douglas was implying
that the two sections were alternative remedies at least for residents
of the same housing unit.
In Warth v. Seldin,4 a decision which dealt primarily with the
"case or controversy" standing requirements of article III, the Su-
preme Court reiterated its holding in Trafficante. The Warth Court
stated that section 3610 gave "residents of housing facilities covered
by the statute an actionable right to be free from the adverse conse-
quences to them of racially discriminatory practices directed at and
immediately harmful to others."65 In its reading of Trafficante in
Warth, the Court seems to be reaffirming the limitation of the
"person aggrieved" language of section 3610 in third party suits to
complainants who raise the rights of third parties seeking to live in
the same housing unit.
IV. Third Party Suits: Section 3612
In TOPIC v. Circle Realty,66 the Ninth Circuit denied standing to
plaintiffs suing under section 3612 because the court found section
62. 409 U.S. at 212.
63. Id. at 209. The Court's opinion does not cite the source of this quote. However, the
same phrase can be found in section 3612. See 42 U.S.C. § 3612(a) (1970).
64. 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (5-4 decision). In Warth, a not-for-profit corporation and eight
individuals, five of whom were non-residents, argued that the zoning ordinances of a Roches-
ter, New York suburb barring low and middle income housing operated to unlawfully exclude
minority groups and inflate local taxes. Plaintiffs did not allege violation of the 1968 Act, but
chose to rely on 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970). Thus, the complaint did not allege racial discrimina-
tion directly and merely attacked the zoning laws as indirectly discriminating againt all
middle and low income groups. The Supreme Court denied standing because plaintiffs could
not demonstrate a personal stake in the case, and in reality, were litigating third party rights.
Id. at 504, 507, 509-10, 513 n.21, 514, 516.
65. Id. at 513.
66. 532 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 160 (1977). The Supreme Court
reversed the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 212. The court of
appeals had held that third party rights could not be litigated under section 3610 and took
the position that the 1968 Act could be used only by persons who were the direct objects of
discrimination in housing. 446 F.2d at 1162-63. In its opinion, the court of appeals, in denying
standing to plaintiffs under section 3610 stated: "Alternatively, a person may bring a civil
action . . . under section 3612. apparently, implying that the provisions were alterna-
tive remedies. Id. at 1161.
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3612 did not authorize lawsuits vindicating the rights of third par-
ties." Plaintiffs were an interracial civil rights organization
(TOPIC) and various individuals. The members of TOPIC were
drawn from an area of metropolitan Los Angeles comprising 100,000
people. In 1973 TOPIC sent teams of white and black home seekers
of approximately equal financial means to seventeen real estate
brokers in the area. The tests indicated that the brokers were direct-
ing non-white couples to houses in non-white residential areas and
directing white couples to white residential areas, a practice known
as racial steering. 8 Plaintiffs claimed racial steering violated the
1968 Act and filed suit in federal district court under section 3612.1
The complaint alleged that plaintiffs had been denied the impor-
tant social and professional benefits of living in an integrated com-
munity and were being stigmatized as residents of either black or
white ghettos. 0 This allegation of injury was exactly the same as the
one made by plaintiffs in Trafficante.
TOPIC raised the rights of third parties because the test couples
were not bona fide purchasers and, thus, were not the primary vic-
tims of the alleged discriminatory practices. The question of stand-
ing was immediately raised and the district court upheld the suit
based on Trafficante.7'
The district court found that Trafficante's principle of broadly
granting standing under the 1968 Act was not restricted to residents
of an apartment complex or suits under section 3610.72 The court
noted that the Supreme Court in Trafficante clearly indicated that
standing under the 1968 Act could be extended "only to tenants of
a housing project complaining of discriminatory practices of the
management."73 However, the court concluded that such language
67. 532 F.2d at 1275.
68. Id. at 1274.
69. Id. The New York Times recently described the practice of racial steering in the rental
of apartments in New York City. N.Y. Times, June 28, 1976, at 1, col. 1.
70. 532 F.2d at 1274. Jurisdiction was also asserted under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4) (1970) which
states:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law
to be commenced by any person ... To recover damages or to secure equitable or other
relief under any Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights ....
71. 377 F. Supp. 111 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
72. Id. at 114.
73. Id.
[Vol. V
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merely presupposed some "outer limits" to a grant of standing and
would not preclude a suit, such as TOPIC, where the situation was
"so similar" to Trafficante.75 The court noted that the apartment
complex in Trafficante housed 8,200 residents and concluded that
the case applied to TOPIC because the organization's membership
lived in a closely settled area, patronized the same stores, attended
the same churches and sent their children to the same schools.7" In
completing this analogy, the court stated: "If any of the 8,200 resi-
dents of an apartment complex can be injured by virtue of the loss
of important benefits from interracial associations surely the resi-
dents of [this] community can and do suffer similar depriva-
tions."I'
Finally, the district court said that since TOPIC was brought
under section 3612 and that Trafficante was a section 3610 case was
an irrelevant distinction because it seemed "clear that the congres-
sional intention was to define the right to sue under [section] 3612
at least as broadly as under [section] 3610(d)." 78
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court,
distinguishing Trafficante since it was brought under section 3610.70
On the basis of Warth, the court reasoned that the Supreme Court
had restricted Trafficante to section 3610 cases.'" Thus Trafficante
was not proper precedent for plaintiffs in TOPIC. Additionally, the
court of appeals said section 3612 was meant only for plaintiffs "who
are the direct objects of the practices it makes unlawful."" Al-
though racial steering was outlawed by section 3612, the court
concluded that none of the plaintiffs had standing under that sec-
tion since they were raising the rights of third parties.2
The court of appeals proffered a general description of the type
of complainants envisioned by the 1968 Act. It found that Congress
intended the unconditional judicial relief of section 3612 for plain-
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 115 n.5.
79. 532 F.2d at 1276.
80. Id. at 1275.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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tiffs who would "suffer grave and immediate harm," ' if forced to
exhaust the administrative procedures of section 3610. In contrast,
the court concluded that section 3612 was meant for a "broad spec-
trum of individuals aggrieved by discrimination" '84 who could wait
for "the resolution of disputes in the slower, less adversary context
of administrative reconciliation and mediation." 85 To support this
position, the court stated that the "statutory pattern" of the 1968
Act would be destroyed if sections 3610 and 3612 were extended to
identical plaintiffs because complainants could always avoid ad-
ministrative remedies by suing under section 3612.11
Recently, in Fair Housing Council, Inc. v. Eastern Bergen County
Multiple Listings Service, Inc., 7 the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey refused to follow the Ninth Circuit's
decision in TOPIC. Plaintiffs, white residents of a predominantly
white neighborhood, brought suit under section 3612 alleging pre-
cisely the same injury as the apartment residents in Trafficante.5
Relying on Trafficante, the district court found no reason why resi-
dents of racially segregated neighborhoods and communities are
"less injured in fact" than residents of large apartment complexes
which are subject to similar discrimination. 9 Consequently, the
court granted plaintiffs standing to argue third party rights under
section 3612.1"
83. Id. at 1275-76.
84. Id. at 1276.
85. Id.
86. Id. The court of appeals contended that a complainant would always avoid the admin-
istrative remedies of section 3610 and thereby diminish the value of the section. Id. See Note,
Discrimination in Employment and in Housing: Private Enforcement Provisions of the Civil
Rights Acts of 1964 and 1968, 82 HARv. L. REV. 834, 855-56 (1969).
87. 422 F. Supp. 1071 (D.N.J. 1976).
88. Id. at 1080-81. The suit was filed under section 3612 by the Fair Housing Council of
Bergen County against four multiple listing services and five real estate brokerage agencies.
The complaint alleged that defendants practiced racial steering in violation of section 3604(a)
of the 1968 Act which resulted in a "distinctively shaped" segregated community. Id. at 1074-
75. Unlike TOPIC, plaintiffs, although advocating the rights of third parties, represented
actual home seekers who could point to a "quantum of personal injury." Id. at 1075, 1079-
80.
89. Id. at 1081-82. The district court, rejecting the Ninth Circuit's analysis of Trafficante,
stated: "The fact that the alleged injury affects a large number of people in a large geographic
area does not serve to attenuate it. On the contrary, it makes the harm more severe. ...
That the cordon sanitaire [i.e., buffer zonel has been drawn around an entire community
rather than a single apartment complex does not render it lawful." Id. at 1081.
90. Id. at 1082-83. The district court concluded by rejecting the proposition that section
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V. Conclusion
The Ninth Circuit held in TOPIC, "that the language of section
3612 does not authorize lawsuits to vindicate the rights of third
parties."'" This holding appears contrary to the trend established by
the cases decided under sections 3610 and 3612 of the 1968 Act." In
cases brought by persons directly discriminated against in housing,
the courts found sections 3610 and 3612 to be alternative remedies.'
The Supreme Court in Trafficante opened section 3610 to plaintiffs
arguing for the rights of third parties. On the basis of these deci-
sions, it follows that, at a minimum, plaintiffs from "the same hous-
ing unit" can argue third party rights under section 3612.11
TOPIC appears to stand for the proposition that section 3610 is
meant for complainants who do not require an immediate remedy
and can afford to wait for administrative remedies." The Ninth
Circuit would prefer to restrict section 3612 to plaintiffs who needed
the more expeditious remedies available under this section. 6 This
construction implies that the direct victim of discriminatory hous-
ing practices, unable to show the need for an expeditious judicial
remedy, would be denied standing under section 3612; a position not
taken by any court previously and unsupportable by the legislative
history of the 1968 Act.
In Trafficante, the Supreme Court stressed that plaintiffs had
alleged injury with particularity, thus avoiding any article III prob-
lems."7 The extension of Trafficante to include other plaintiffs argu-
ing for the rights of third parties under the 1968 Act will probably
be accomplished through a sufficient allegation of injury. Some
courts have already taken this approach."
3612 was meant for "direct victims" of housing discrimination, but it hesitated to rely on
Trafficante in deciding the question of standing under that section. Instead, the court extra-
polated from prior decisions of the Third Circuit to grant standing under section 3612. Id.
91. 532 F.2d at 1275.
92. See note 8 supra.
93. Id.
94. See text accompanying notes 49-63 supra.
95. 532 F.2d at 1275-76.
96. Id. at 1276. This position is similar to the one taken by the Ninth Circuit'in
Trafficante. 446 F.2d at 1162-63.
97. 409 U.S. at 211.
98. See Boyd v. Lefrak Organization, 509 F.2d 1110, 1116 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 896 (1975) (Trafficante called for a generous construction of the 1968 Act and the
enforcement provisions therein must be judged by that principle); Otero v. New York City
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While the plaintiffs in Trafficante could allege specific injury
under the 1968 Act, it is arguable that the TOPIC complainants
who were not bona fide purchasers"9 were merely alleging a general-
ized grievance. Reliance on an injury standard for standing under
the 1968 Act when third party rights are involved might be preferred
over the Ninth Circuit's absolute bar to such plaintiffs. The district
court in Fair Housing Council, Inc. ,00 is the first court to follow this
approach for section 3612. In the final analysis, it should be remem-
bered that the policy of the 1968 Act is "to provide within constitu-
tional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States."','
Gary A. Grasso
Housing Auth., 484 F.2d 1122, 1134 (2d Cir. 1973) (Trafficante was authority that the loss of
important benefits from interracial association was a sufficient allegation of injury by existing
tenants to meet standing requirements under section 3612); Evans v. Lynn, 376 F. Supp. 327,
331 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 537 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1975) (Trafficante was authority that the
Supreme Court has declared that the Civil Rights Act of 1968 evinced a congressional inten-
tion to define standing as broadly as is permissible by article III); Fort v. White, 383 F. Supp.
949, 952-53 (D. Conn. 1974) (Trafficante stood for the proposition that section 3612 was not
to be read narrowly when considering standing questions).
99. 532 F.2d at 1275.
100. See notes 87-90 supra and accompanying text.
101. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1970).
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